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THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE HUMANITARIAN
LAW OF WARFARE: RECENT EFFORTS AT CODIFICATION
The development of the law of warfare in the twentieth century has
been characterized by an increasing concern for the plight of civilians
in armed conflicts. The various codifications of the law of warfare, most
notably the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter, Civilians Convention),I contain
an elaborate set of rules governing civilian protection.2 However, these
codifications do not expressly include proportionality-the notion that
the civilian losses resulting from a military act should not be excessive
in relation to the anticipated military advantage-as a principle of civil-
ian protection. The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts (hereinafter, Diplomatic Conference), which is being held in
Geneva, is considering articles which would codify the principle of pro-
portionality for the first time.3
1. IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The Civilians
Convention is one of four 1949 Geneva Conventions. The others are the Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
135. While these latter three conventions were revisions of previous Geneva conventions,
the Civilians Convention was an entirely new codification. For a discussion of the provi-
sions of the Civilians Convention, see COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (J. Pictet ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited
as COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION].
2. Codifications such as the Geneva Convention have been criticized for failing to
provide actual protection for civilians. Critics have emphasized that since the adoption
of the Conventions in 1949, belligerent nations have often violated the Conventions and
refused to acknowledge the applicability of the Conventions to particular conflicts. See
Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference
on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1975). The Civilians Convention has also
been characterized as inadequate in a number of specific areas; for example, it fails to
prescribe rules governing aerial bombardment. Id. at 2-3.
3. For a discussion of the background to the Diplomatic Conference, see Baxter, supra
note 2. See also F. KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE: A SUMMARY OF ITS RECENT HISTORY
AND TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT (1973); Hewitt, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Con-
flicts, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 41 (1971).
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This Note will address the issue of whether proportionality is a worka-
ble principle of civilian protection. After addressing the threshold ques-
tion of when the proportionality principle is applicable, the Note will
discuss the means by which the proportionality principle can be incor-
porated into military decision-making. To the extent that clear-cut cri-
teria can be developed for predicting the consequences of military acts
upon the civilian population, a commanding officer will be able to assess
the proportionality of military acts under consideration. His willingness
to do so, however, may depend largely on whether effective sanctions
can be developed to deter and punish violations of proportionality. The
issue of enforcement of the principle will be discussed in the latter part
of the Note.
The basic sequence of events leading to the Diplomatic Conference was as follows. In
1971 and 1972 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) held conferences of
government experts to update the 1949 Geneva Conventions. On the basis of these confer-
ences the ICRC then prepared and submitted to the Swiss government two draft protocols
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, one of which dealt with international conflicts and the
other with non-international conflicts. The Swiss government in turn convened the Diplo-
matic Conference to consider these protocols. The first session met from February 20,
1974, to March 29, 1974, and the second session met from February 3, 1975, to April 18,
1975. One hundred and twenty-five states participated at the first session, and one
hundred and twenty-one states took part in the second session. The United States, the
Soviet Union, and other major powers with the exception of the People's Republic of China
were present at these sessions. In addition, a number of national liberation movements,
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, participated in the Conference. The results
of these sessions are reported in REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE DIPLO-
MATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, SECOND SESSION, FEB. 3-APR. 18, 1975 (report
submitted to the Secretary of State, July 18, 1975) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
This Note will focus on Protocol I, which concerns international conflicts. Unless other-
wise specified, all references to articles concern those in Protocol I. Protocol II, which
involved non-international conflicts, is less elaborate and does not explicitly codify the
proportionality principle. However, Article 24(2) of Protocol II provides, "Constant care
shall be taken, when conducting military operations, to spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects. This rule shall, in particular, apply to the planning, decid-
ing, or launching of an attack." Id. at 85. The existing law of civilian protection in non-
international conflicts is much less elaborate than the law applicable to international
conflicts. The 1949 Geneva Conventions' rules concerning non-international conflicts are
concentrated almost entirely in Article 3, which is common to all four conventions. This
article contains a number of general provisions, such as prohibitions against "outrages
upon personal dignity." For critiques of Article 3, see Bond, Protection of Non-
Combatants in Guerilla Wars, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 787 (1971); Farer, The Laws of
Warfare 25 Years After Nuremberg, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 583 (1971); Note,
Civilian Protection in Modern Warfare: A Critical Analysis of the Geneva Civilian Con-
vention of 1949, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 123 (1973). See also Farer, Humanitarian Law and
Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of "International Armed Conflicts," 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 37 (1971), which, in addition to discussing the deficiencies of Article 3, addresses
the problem of distinguishing between international and non-international conflicts.
Cornell International Law Journal
I
BACKGROUND
A. PROPORTIONALITY AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE
Although proportionality has yet to be codified as a principle of civil-
ian protection, the idea that military means should be proportionate to
their anticipated ends is widely recognized as a basic norm of the law
of warfare.' Proportionality is closely related to other underlying princi-
ples of the law of warfare, such as military necessity and discrimination
between combatants and non-combatants.' For example, a military act
cannot be proportionate unless there is some military necessity for the
operation in the first place. Similarly, if an act fails to discriminate
between civilians and military targets, it may cause civilian losses that
will be disproportionate in relation to the military advantage.
B. EXISTING CODIFICATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY
The two major existing codifications of the law of warfare which deal
with civilian protection are the 1907 Hague Convention on Land War-
fare' and the 1949 Civilians Convention previously noted.7 These con-
ventions have somewhat different orientations; while the basic 'concern
of the Hague Convention is the means of conducting warfare, the Civil-
ians Convention emphasizes the treatment of civilians in warfare, e.g.
civilian detention.' Despite their failure to explicitly incorporate propor-
tionality, both conventions contain provisions which touch upon the
proportionality principle. The Hague Convention contains a clause
which provides that the signatory nations shall observe the general prin-
ciples of warfare recognized by civilized nations.9 In addition, this Con-
4. See J. PicT', HUMANITARIAN LAW 31 (transl. 1975). Pictet states the principle as
follows: "[Bielligerents shall not inflict on their adversaries harm out of proportion to
the object of warfare, which is to destroy or weaken the military strength of the enemy."
Id.
5. See Falk, Richard A. Falk, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE: THE VITrNAM
EXPERIENCE 40 (P. Trooboff ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TROOBOFF]. See also Farer, The
Laws of War 25 Years After Nuremberg, 583 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 16 (1971).
6. For a detailed discussion of the Hague Convention, see W. HULL, THE Two HAGUE
CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS To INTERNATIONAL LAW (1908, reprinted 1970).
7. See note 1 supra.
8. See PicTET, supra note 4, at 16-17. Pictet divides the law of warfare into two
branches: "the law of The Hague," which "determines the rights and duties of belligerents
in the conduct of operations and limits the choice of the means of doing harm," and the
"law of Geneva," which is "intended to safeguard military personnel placed hors de
combat, and persons not taking part in hostilities." Id.
9. This clause, known as the Martens Clause, has generally been viewed as ineffectual.
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vention is permeated by the concept of military necessity, which is
closely related to proportionality.' 0 Similarly, Article 53 of the Civilians
Convention prohibits destruction of property by an "Occupying Power"
"except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by mil-
itary operations."" Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the two conven-
tions with respect to the proportionality principle are substantial. For
example, while Article 18 of the Civilians Convention provides that
civilian hospitals may not be the object of attack, it adds that "[fn
view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed by being close
to military objectives, it is recommended that such hospitals be situated
as far as possible from such objectives.' 2 The existing codifications fail
to address many of the problems involved in reconciling the recognition
of legitimate military objectives with the desire to provide adequate
protection to civilians. 3
C. THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY
The Diplomatic Conference's proposed codification of the proportion-
ality principle is an attempt to fill one of the gaps in civilian protection
left by previous codifications. Article 50 of the Conference's Protocol I
provides in part that a party shall not launch attacks which may be
expected to cause civilian losses that would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.'4 Article 50(3)
provides that "when a choice is possible between several military objec-
tives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be
selected shall be that which may be expected to cause the least danger
to civilian lives and property.' 5 In addition, Protocol I contains other
provisions that are related to proportionality, notably the requirement
under Article 51 that parties take feasible precautions to protect civil-
Nations have regarded its provisions as mere "signposts" to nations at war, as applying
only to parties to the Convention, as providing only fragmentary protection of a few basic
freedoms, and as failing to prescribe any enforcement mechanisms. See Note, Civilian
Protection in Modern Warfare: A Critical Analysis of the Geneva Civilian Convention of
1949, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 123, 126 (1973).
10. See G. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 96 (1958). Article 23(g) of the 1907
Hague Convention on Land Warfare makes an express allowance for military necessity.
11. IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, August 12, 1949, art. 53, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
The Civilians Convention does not permit the military necessity defense to the extent that
the Hague Convention does. See DRAPER, supra note 10, at 97.
12. IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, August 12, 1949, art. 18, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
13. See DRAPER, supra note 10, at 33.
14. These articles can be found in REPORT, supra note 3.
15. REPORT, supra note 3, at 69.
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ians against the effects of attacks,'" Article 47(2)'s requirement that
parties strictly limit their attacks to military objectives, the prohibition
in Article 46(3) against indiscriminate attacks," and the prohibition in
Article 49 against attacks on works or installations which contain
dangerous forces (such as nuclear power plants and dams), where such
attacks may cause severe civilian losses, even if such works are otherwise
legitimate military objectives. These articles have been adopted by a
committee of the Conference'" and await approval by the entire Confer-
ence and subsequent ratification by the signatory nations.
II
ANALYSIS OF PROPORTIONALITY
A. WHEN Is THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE APPLICABLE?
The proposed codification of proportionality has been a source of con-
siderable controversy at the recent Geneva conferences on the law of
warfare. At the 1972 "Conference of Experts," which was the predeces-
sor of the Diplomatic Conferences, some delegates maintained that pro-
portionality derogated from the prohibitions against outright civilian
attacks by providing a legal justification for some military acts which
cause civilian damage.'9
The proportionality provision was, however, intended to complement
rather than detract from the articles banning civilian attacks. A
distinction can be made between attacks which are aimed primarily at
civilians, such as terror bombings," and attacks which involve legiti-
16. These include endeavoring to remove the civilian population and civilian objects
under a party's control from the vicinity of military objectives.
17. Article 46(3) recognizes that the principle of discrimination which it codifies will
overlap with the proportionality principle. It provides that "Among others, the following
types of acts are to be considered as indiscriminate:. . . (b) An attack of the type prohib-
ited by Article 50(2) (a)(iii)," i.e., an attack in which the probable civilian losses will be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. REPORT,
supra note 3, at 65. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
18. In addition to being responsible for consideration of the articles on civilian protec-
tion, this committee (Committee III) was also responsible for the Articles on methods and
means of combat and a proposed new category of prisoners of war. Committee I dealt with
the general provisions of Protocol I (international armed conflicts), and Committee II
considered the articles on the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, on civil defense, and on
relief.
19. See CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTs ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTs, 2D SEss., REPORT
ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 153 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE].
20. Terror bombings are prohibited by Article 46(1), which provides that "the civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be made the object of attack.
[Vol. 10:134
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mate military objectives.2 Obviously, the laws of warfare could not
categorically prohibit the latter without treating warfare as illegal per
se. Thus, while the articles of the Diplomatic Conference completely
proscribe attacks aimed at civilians or civilian objects, they permit at-
tacks involving legitimate military objectives under certain circumstan-
ces, e.g. if the act is not disproportionate or indiscriminate.22
This distinction between the two different types of military acts is,
then, crucial in determining when the proportionality principle is ap-
plicable. In some instances it is difficult to categorize a military act in
this manner. This.is especially true of guerilla warfare,2 where the
Acts or threats of violence which have the primary object of spreading terror among the
civilian population are prohibited." REPORT, supra note 3, at 65.
Not only have terror bombings been condemned on the ground that terrorization and
demoralization of the enemy civilian population are not legitimate military objectives, but
such bombings have been characterized as militarily ineffective as well. The enemy is
often able to prevent demoralization through its propaganda machinery; this is particu-
larly true of totalitarian powers such as Nazi Germany. Also, terror bombings tend to
provoke anger and resentment among the enemy's civilian population rather than demor-
alization, thereby strengthening the adversary's will to fight. See Adler, Targets in War:
Legal Considerations, 8 HOUSTON L. REv. 1, 40-42 (1970); Carnahan, The Law of Air
Bombardment in Its Historical Context, 17 AIR FORCE L. REv. 39, 50-51 (1975).
It is extremely difficult to distinguish between a terror bombing and a bombing of
civilian areas intended to coerce the enemy into a political settlement, since terrorization
can serve as a means of coercing the enemy. Also, the nature of the attack will be the same
regardless of the underlying intent. Article 46(1) forbids any such attack against civilians.
21. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 60; Adler, supra note 20, at 30. See also Article 43
of the Diplomatic Conference, which provides that "in order to ensure respect and protec-
tion for the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives." REPORT, supra note 3, at 64.
22. See Article 43, REPORT, supra note 3, at 64. See also Article 46, concerning general
protection of the civilian population, and Article 47, concerning general protection of
civilian objects. Article 50, which codifies proportionality, also addresses the problem of
distinguishing between attacks on civilians and acts based on military objectives; Article
50(5) provides that "no provision of this article may be construed as authorization for any
attacks against the civilian population, civilians, or civilian objects." REPORT, supra note
3, at 70.
23. Article 1, section 2 of Protocol I (international conflicts) extends the scope of Proto-
col I's applicability to many guerilla conflicts by providing that the protocol shall cover
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Decla-
ration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
This provision generated considerable controversy at the Diplomatic Conference. See
REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
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counter-insurgent often finds it difficult to distinguish the guerillas from
the population at large and resorts to extreme military tactics, such as
the destruction of entire hamlets, to isolate the guerilla forces.2' In such
cases the military objectives are closely intermingled with civilians or
civilian objects.2 However, in those situations where such ambiguities
are the greatest, the act would likely be illegal even if the proportionality
principle were applicable, since the civilian damage would be exces-
sive.2"
B. WEIGHING THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE AGAINST THE CIVILIAN DAMAGE
Proportionality can only be a viable principle of civilian protection if
it can be applied at the time military decisions are being made. It will
be ineffective if it is merely a hindsight principle." A decision as to the
proportionality of a military act will involve weighing the anticipated
military advantage against the probable civilian losses that will result
from a particular military act.
1. Meaning of "Military Advantage"
An initial question which must be addressed in applying the propor-
Another provision of Protocol I which addresses the problems of civilian protection in
guerilla warfare is Article 45(3), which states, "The presence, within the civilian popula-
tion, of individuals who do not fall within the definition of civilians does not deprive the
population of its civilian character." REPORT, supra note 3, at 64. Also, Article 45(4)
provides that "in case of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, such person shall be
considered to be a civilian." REPORT, supra note 3, at 64. Articles 25(3) and 25(4) of
Protocol II (non-international conflicts) are almost identical to Articles 45(3) and 45(4)
respectively.
24. See Falk, in TROOBOFF, supra note 5, at 44. See also T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND
VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 145 (1970).
25. The Hungarian delegation to the 1971 Conference of Experts sought unsuccessfully
to include a provision that "no military advantage may justify an operation in which it is
impossible to make a clear distinction between military and non-military objectives." See
CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLIcrs, 1ST SESS., REPORT ON TIlE
WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 82 (1971). However, the substance of this proposal is reflected
in the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks in Article 46(3).
26. The United States' Christmas bombings of North Vietnam in 1972, for example,
have been criticized both on the basis of proportionality and on other grounds. Telford
Taylor has argued that the bombings inflicted civilian losses that were disproportionate
to the military advantage, whereas others have maintained that the bombings were un-
lawful because they were not primarily designed to weaken the enemy militarily but rather
to coerce the enemy into a political settlement. See DeSaussure & Glasser, Hamilton
DeSaussure and Robert Glasser, in T!ROOBOl, supra note 5, at 137-39.
27. See DeSaussure, Hamilton DeSaussure, in TROOBOFF, supra note 5, at 71. See also
KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 66-67.
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tionality principle is the proper interpretation of the term "military
advantage." This term can be construed either on a "case-by-case" or
on a "cumulative" basis; the former refers to the specific tactical objec-
tive of a particular action, whereas the latter refers to the manner in
which the action will contribute to the belligerent's overall strategic
goals.2 Whether an action satisfies the proportionality test will depend
on which interpretation of "military advantage" is used for analytical
purposes.
The most notable example of this dilemma in modem warfare was the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States in 1945.
These attacks were the culmination of an extensive fire-bomb campaign
by the United States which was intended to inflict heavy damage on
the Japanese war industry, thereby pressuring the Japanese into surren-
der.2 9 The Americans argued that the military advantage gained from
the bombings was sufficiently strong to justify them, as evidenced by
the prompt Japanese surrender which eliminated the necessity of an
Allied invasion of Japan which would have inflicted heavy casualties on
both sides. Not surprisingly, the Japanese took a very different view
of the meaning of "military advantage." In Shimoda v. State,3 a Japa-
nese court held that the use of the atomic bomb was illegal under the
laws of warfare 32 since "aerial bombardment with an atomic bomb, even
if its target is confined to military objectives, brings about the same
result as a blind aerial bombardment because of the tremendous de-
structive power of the bomb. '33 Thus, the court focused on the particu-
lar military advantage resulting from the destruction of specific military
objectives, as opposed to the "cumulative" approach taken by the
United States.
More recently, the "military advantage" issue has arisen in a number
of guerilla conflicts. For example, the United States pursued a strategy
in Vietnam of devastating areas of the countryside where guerillas were
28. See Farer, supra note 5, at 16-17.
29. The United States' reliance on incendiary bombing was due to the extreme in-
flammability of Japanese building materials, the failure of attacks using high-explosive
bombs, and the fact that Japanese industry was highly dispersed. See Carnahan, supra
note 20, at 56.
30. The Allies estimated that United States casualties from an invasion of Japan would
have amounted to some 500,000 dead. Id. at 57.
31. 32 I.L.R. 626 (District Court of Tokyo, Japan 1963). This case involved a suit by
several persons injured in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki against the govern-
ment of Japan for failing to assert a claim on their behalf against the United States for
the "illegal" bombing of the two cities.
32. The plaintiffs' claims, however, were denied on other grounds.
33. 32 I.L.R. at 632.
1976]
Cornell International Law Journal
reported to be operating. The United States justified these actions on
the grounds that their cumulative effect was to keep the enemy forces
constantly on the move and to separate the guerillas from their base of
support.34 These actions were, however, widely condemned on the basis
that the civilian losses greatly outweighed the guerilla casualties result-
ing from particular military operations.
The Diplomatic Conference appears to favor the "case-by-case" ap-
proach, as is indicated by the use of the phrase "concrete and direct
military advantage" in Article 50. 31 Certainly, a "case-by-case" inter-
pretation of "military advantage" is more consistent with the Confer-
ence's desire to provide more stringent protections to civilians than have
heretofore existed. In view of the Conference's outright prohibitions
against attacks on the civilian population, it is extremely unlikely, for
example, that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be legiti-
mate military acts under the Conference's provisions, regardless of their
cumulative military advantages. The "cumulative" approach has been
defended on the basis that taking civilian lives now will save more lives
later . 3 Yet this approach would greatly weaken the specific protections
accorded civilians under the laws of warfare. Also, the standard for
measuring the legality of an act would become vague and elusive, due
to the difficulty of assessing how, if at all, an act prevented undesirable
future events and of determining how serious the adverse consequences
would have been.37 Therefore, both policy factors and the language of
the Conference's articles support a "case-by-case" interpretation of
"military advantage."
2. Means of Conducting Warfare
The probable civilian damage, the second variable in the proportion-
ality equation, will depend on the particular weapons and techniques of
warfare that are employed. In this context, one of the mostimportant
characteristics of a weapon or technique is its controllability-the ex-
tent to which the damage resulting from its use can be limited to a
specific military target. Telford Taylor has contrasted aerial bombard-
34. See Farer, supra note 5, at 16-17. Such cumulative effects, however, may be more
difficult to ascertain than more immediate effects such as battle casualties. Information
on movement of guerilla forces, for example, may not be readily available, especially in
view of the furtive nature of guerilla warfare.
35. REPORT, supra note 3, at 69. This phraseology also indicates that there has to be a
reasonable basis for anticipation of a military advantage; a vague expectation of military
benefit would be insufficient.
36. See Carnahan, supra note 20, at 57.
37. See note 34 supra.
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ment and ground warfare in this regard, stating that it is generally more
difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants with
the former method." Nuclear weapons have been condemned largely
because of their uncontrollability as regards both incendiary and radia-
tion damage. 9 Similar criticisms have been directed against biological
and chemical warfare,4" although distinctions have been drawn between
various types of biological and chemical weapons, such as epidemic and
non-epidemic weapons, on the basis of their degree of controllability.4
In ascertaining a weapon's controllability, it is necessary to examine not
only the immediate destruction wrought by its use but also the more
long-range effects such as environmental damage caused by crop de-
struction or defoliation." Such damage is often more difficult to justify
on proportionality grounds than immediate destruction, since it bears
a "less proximate and more remote" 3 relationship to the military ad-
vantage that was initially sought.
In addition to controllability, the special military benefits which a
weapon or technique offers also have a significant bearing on proportion-
ality. If a certain weapon or technique provides a uniquely or especially
effective means of attaining a particular military advantage, this would
tend to countervail (for the purposes of assessing proportionality) the
greater civilian damage that could result from its use. On this basis, it
has been suggested that the proportionality principle might even permit
the use of a weapon such as napalm, despite the severe civilian damage
which has resulted from its use in Vietnam and elsewhere." The special
38. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 142-43. This would involve the principles of discrimi-
nation as well as proportionality.
39. As Farer points out, tactical nuclear weapons "have yields up to and even exceeding
those which obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . . ." Farer, supra note 5, at 22. See
also N. SINGH, NUcLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (1959).
40. Farer draws the following comparison between chemical and biological warfare and
nuclear weapons:
Both are likely to have indiscriminate effects; there is danger in both cases of long-
term injury to the target population. And, in addition, there is danger in both
cases to the citizens of neutral states, and, indeed, of the states employing these
means. Finally, in neither case can the available technology of defense accomplish
more than a moderation of the potential devastation.
Farer, supra note 5, at 23.
41. See A. THoMAs & A.J. THOMAS, JR., LEGAL LIMrrs ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 208 (1970).
42. Id. at 210.
43. Id.
44. Farer has observed, "The depressing reality . . .is that napalm appears to be a
grimly effective and, if military authorities are to be believed, not easily replaceable
weapon for attacking fortified positions, particularly underground bunkers." Farer, supra
note 5, at 22. See also Remarks by George H. Aldrich in Human Rights and Armed
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benefits argument may, however, violate the directive of Article 50(3),
which provides:
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for ob-
taining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall
be that which may be expected to cause the least damage to civilian lives
and to civilian objects."5
If the word "similar" is construed broadly, it would be difficult to justify
use of a special military benefit. The intent of the Diplomatic Confer-
ence to strengthen the law of civilian protection would seem to support
such a broad construction."
It has been argued that a more stringent standard of proportionality
should govern the use of weapons in a limited war as compared to a
general war.17 One authority has suggested, for example, that while only
a few types of non-epidemic and non-lethal biological and chemical
weapons would meet the standards of proportionality in a limited war,
a wider range of such weapons would be permissible in a total war."
However, by using the phrase "concrete and direct military advantage,"
the Diplomatic Conference reduces the importance of the overall mili-
tary context as a direct factor in proportionality, although it retains its
importance insofar as it determines or shapes the specific military ad-
vantage that is anticipated.
The above factors raise the issue of whether any weapon or technique
of warfare is inherently violative of the proportionality principle.
Nuclear weapons are the most obvious candidates for such a classifica-
tion. 9 Although a case for proportionality could perhaps be made to
justify the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against a major military
target far removed from the civilian population, even here the fallout
level could cause considerable civilian damage."0 Additionally, a nuclear
Conflicts: Conflicting Views, 1973 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 141, 148. But see Remarks by
Frits Kalshoven, id. at 160.
45. REPoirr, supra note 3, at 69.
46. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
47. See A. ThoMs & A.J. THoMAs, JR., supra note 41, at 208-10.
48. Id.
49. See notes 39 and 40 supra.
50. Proportionality would depend in part on whether a case-by-case or cumulative
approach were used. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. However, as noted above,
Article 50 leans towards the case-by-case approach. See note 35 supra and accompanying
text. Also, if the reason for using nuclear weapons rather than conventional weapons is to
pressure the other side into an early political settlement, it would probably not be re-
garded as a legitimate military objective. See notes 20 and 26 supra. Finally, the fact that
civilian damage from fallout is a less immediate and more long-range type of destruction
would militate against the view that the use of nuclear weapons is proportionate in some
[Vol. 10:134
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weapon would not necessarily be that much more effective than conven-
tional weapons in destroying an isolated military base or target. Thus,
even if nuclear weapons are not per se disproportionate, they would
satisfy the proportionality requirement only in the most extreme cir-
cumstances. The same could be said of other highly uncontrollable
methods of warfare such as lethal and epidemic biological and chemical
warfare.5'
3. The Military Target
In order to predict the civilian losses which will result from a particu-
lar military act, it is necessary to assess the nature of the military target
as well as the method of warfare. The officer will typically have less
information about the military target than about the weapons and tech-
niques of warfare at his disposal, since the target will be in hostile
territory. However, military intelligence and information-gathering
have made dramatic advances in the post-World War II era,52 as is
illustrated by the "elint," or electromagnetic intelligence, system which
the United States Air Force operates around the world.53 Even in air
warfare, where the target is more remote than in ground warfare, the use
of various means of information-gathering enables an officer to obtain
circumstances. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
Some observers have suggested that even if nuclear weapons were not permissible in
the first instance, their use as a means of reprisal could be justified. A reprisal is a measure
contrary to law which is taken in retaliation against a prior illegal act by the enemy in
order to deter such acts in the future. At the very least, the reprisal would have to be
proportionate to the prior act; thus, nuclear weapons probably could only be used as
retaliation against the prior use of nuclear weapons by the adversary. See SINGH, supra
note 39, at 220.
Even if the reprisal were proportionate, however, it would be difficult to justify such
acts under the law of warfare. Article 33 of the Civilians Convention prohibits reprisals
against "protected persons" and their property ("protected persons" as defined in Article
4 are those persons not protected by the other Geneva Conventions who find themselves
in the hands of a Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals). Furthermore, Articles 46 and 47 of the Diplomatic Conference provide respec-
tively that civilians and civilian objects shall not be made the objects of reprisals.
During the Vietnam War the United States often claimed the right to engage in re-
prisals against alleged military provocations. For example, after allegations of attacks
by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in August, 1964 (the Gulf of Tonkin incident), the
United States destroyed several villages in which boats were based. Also, the bombing of
North Vietnam in February, 1965, was justified as a reprisal for a successful Viet Cong
attack on two American air bases. See Falk, International Law and the United States Role
in the Vietnam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966). See also TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 144-45.
51. A. THoMAs & A.J. THOMAS, JR., supra note 41, at 210.
52. See J. TOMPKINS, THE WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR IH 292-303 (1966).
53. Id. at 293.
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elaborate and highly sophisticated data about a prospective military
target.54 This information aids decision-making in at least four respects
vis-A-vis proportionality. First, it identifies the precise location of the
target, which in turn shows its proximity to the civilian population.
Second, it indicates whether the target contains dangerous forces, such
as nuclear reactors, which could cause substantial civilian losses if the
target were destroyed. Third, this information denotes the importance
of the target to the other side's military capabilities and, consequently,
the military advantage that would ensue from obliteration of the target.
Fourth, it indicates the vulnerability of the target to destruction,
thereby enabling an officer to gauge the likelihood of achieving such a
military advantage.
Of course, much of the information on enemy targets which bears on
proportionality can be obtained through less complex means than those
discussed above. For example, the location of the enemy's major muni-
tions works and the distribution of the nearby civilian population may
be matters of ordinary geographical knowledge. Similarly, an officer
would not need extensive intelligence data to determine that substantial
civilian losses would result from bombardment of a major dike." More
technical or sophisticated data might nonetheless be helpful in assessing
the military characteristics of the target, e.g. whether a factory produces
a major supply of military equipment, even where other pertinent infor-
mation such as proximity to civilians could be obtained through simpler
means.
By utilizing all the relevant information at his disposal and consider-
ing the above factors in a systematic and thorough manner, the officer
will find that his ability to apply the proportionality principle will be
greatly enhanced. He will be able to evaluate alternative means of con-
ducting warfare" against a particular target and assess the trade-off in
54. Id. at 294.
55. Generally, bombardment of a major dike or dam would be an illegal act of warfare
under the provisions of the Diplomatic Conference. Article 49 prohibits attacks against
"works or installations containing dangerous forces," even where these objects are military
objectives, where the attack may release these dangerous forces and cause severe civilian
losses. Also, many such works and installations would be dedicated to civilian purposes
such as irrigation or flood control and would thus be subject to Article 47(3), which
provides:
In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian pur-
poses, such as a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 66.
56. Article 50(3) requires an assessment of alternative means of warfare in many in-




each case between the specific military advantage57 and the probable
civilian losses." While this is not to say that the proportionality princi-
ple will not be susceptible at times to erroneous application or that
ambiguous situations will not emerge, at the very least the officer should
be able to recognize blatantly disproportionate acts such as saturation
bombing of insignificant military targets located in large population
centers. Whether the officer will refrain from engaging in such acts,
however, will depend largely on the adequacy of the mechanisms for




A. EXISTING PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
Since the military officer operates under a number of pressures which
could lead him to neglect the proportionality principle, such as time
constraints and orders from superiors, it is crucial that strong sanctions
against disproportionate acts be developed. One of the major deficien-
cies of the Diplomatic Conference is its failure to provide adequate
enforcement mechanisms for violations of proportionality.59 Article 5
does attempt to strengthen the Protecting Power system, whereby
neutral states or international organizations such as the Red Cross send
representatives to the site of the conflict in order to in order to supervise
the belligerents' compliance with the laws of warfare. 0 However, this
57. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
58. Situations may arise in which it becomes apparent to the officer, after he has
decided to launch an attack, that the action would cause disproportionate civilian losses.
Article 50(b) requires the officer to cancel the attack in such instances. Several delegates
to the 1972 Conference of Experts felt that it would be unrealistic to expect a commander
to halt an attack once it had begun. CONFERENCE, supra note 19, at 152.
59. Article 70(2) merely provides that "the High Contracting Parties . . . shall give
orders and instructions to ensure observance of the conventions and the present Protocol
and shall supervise their execution." REPORT, supra note 3, at 74.
60. Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Protecting Power system could only come
into effect if the adversaries agreed to the selection of a Protecting Power or international
organization. Since the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Protecting Powers have been appointed
in only three conflicts: the Suez War of 1956, the 1961 Goa conflict, and the 1971-72 Indo-
Pakistan War (in the latter conflict the Protecting Power exercised a diplomatic role
rather than engaging in the supervisory activities contemplated by the Geneva Conven-
tions). Nor have substitute organizations such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross been appointed in any conflicts. A number of reasons have been suggested for the
failure to use the Protecting Power system; for example, nations may believe that the
presence of a Protecting Power at the site of a conflict would unduly restrict their military
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system is more oriented toward matters involving the continuing treat-
ment of civilians (e.g. occupations of a territory), which lend themselves
to ongoing supervision, than to the discrete military acts such as aerial
attacks which are addressed by the proportionality provisions." More-
over, the actual enforcement powers of Protecting Powers are minimal;
while they can investigate alleged instances of noncompliance and at-
tempt to persuade the party to refrain from such acts in the future, they
do not have the authority to punish violations of the law of warfare. 2
A stronger sanction would be to treat violations of proportionality in
the same manner that "grave breaches" are treated under the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 3 Under Article 146 of the Civilians Convention
(similar provisions are found in the other Geneva Conventions), signa-
tory nations are required to enact legislation "necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions" for grave breaches and to search for and pro-
operations, and they may fear that appointment of a Protecting Power or substitute
organization would amount to recognition of the adversary. See PicrET, supra note 4, at
66-67.
Since the establishment of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, various proposals have been
made to strengthen the Protecting Power system. One such proposal is that in case the
parties on each side of a conflict fail to promptly designate a Protecting Power, the
Protecting Power function would automatically be assumed by a neutral international
organization. See THE FOURTE Hrr HAMMARSKJdLD FORUM, WHEN BATTLE RAGES, How CAN
LAW PROTECT? 68 (1971). Article 5(4) of the Diplomatic Conference does not go this far,
but it provides that if the adversaries fail to initially designate a Protecting Power and
subsequent efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross to find a mutually
acceptable Protecting Power are unsuccessful, then the parties "shall accept without
delay" an offer made by the ICRC or similar organization to act as a substitute. However,
the Article adds:
The functioning of such a substitute is subject to the consent of the Parties to
the conflict; all efforts shall be made by the Parties to facilitate the operation of
a substitute in fulfilling its tasks under this Convention and this Protocol.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 45.
61. See THE FOURTEENTH HAMMARSKJ0"D FORUM, supra note 60, at 66-67.
62. See COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 86-87.
63. Under Article 147 of the Civilians Convention the following acts constitute grave
breaches:
• . . wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experi-
ments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlaw-
ful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compel-
ling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriv-
ing a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and approp'ria-
tion of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
The last act-destruction and appropriation of property-only applies to property ac-




secute"l all persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, 5 grave breaches, regardless of their nationality.66 Parties are
also required under Article 146 to "take measures necessary for the
suppression" of other breaches; such measures could take forms other
than penal legislation, such as administrative sanctions.
If the grave breach sanction were imposed for violations of proportion-
ality, an initial question would arise as to whether all such acts should
be classified as grave breaches. The grave breaches listed under Article
147 of the Civilians Convention are all willful acts. 7 However, in view
of the need to increase the protection of civilians in warfare, there is
good reason to include negligent as well as intentional and reckless
violations of proportionality under the grave breach category. Then sig-
natory nations would be required to treat negligent violations of propor-
tionality as war crimes, although they would be free to punish negligent
behavior less severely than intentional and reckless acts. Violations
which are neither willful nor negligent would be categorized as regular
breaches which the signatory nations could treat by means other than
penal legislation."
Although a negligence standard would place added burdens upon the
officer by holding him to a standard of due care, time constraints and
other pressures on the officer would bear upon the determination of
whether the officer exercised reasonable care. The scienter test would
focus on the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the officer at
the time the act was taken, rather than on hindsight evaluation. This
would accord with the standard enunciated in the Hostages case, 9 where
64. Article 146 also provides that a Party may, if it prefers, and in accordance with its
own legislation, hand persons over for trial to another concerned High Contracting Party,
if such other High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case that the individual
is liable.
65. The Convention does not impose liability for failure to intervene to prevent a breach
by another person. The signatory nations are free to deal with this issue as they see fit.
See COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 591-92.
66. Most signatory nations have not fully complied with the requirement that they
enact special penal legislation. Many countries, including the United States, do not pro-
vide for prosecution of foreign nationals for violations of the Geneva Conventions. See
Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 ORE. L. REV. 260, 269 (1970). Great
Britain, on the other hand, has fully exercised its responsibility in this regard; its legisla-
tion, in accordance with Article 147 of the Civilians Convention, permits prosecution of
foreign nationals within Britain's jurisdiction for alleged war crimes committed on foreign
soil. The Geneva Conventions Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52, § 1 (1957).
67. See note 63 supra.
68. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Wilhelm List, XI TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALs 759 (1948).
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the Nuremberg Tribunal found General Lothar Rendulic not guilty on
the grounds that the "scorched earth" destruction he carried out in a
particular instance was reasonably judged to be militarily necessary at
the time the action was taken."0 The trier of fact would take into account
such factors as whether the officer consulted available reports, whether
he attempted to ascertain probable civilian losses, whether he consid-
ered alternative means of warfare that would inflict less damage on
civilians, and whether he took steps, such as evacuating civilians after
the attack had been initiated, that would minimize civilian casualties."t
Liability for disproportionate acts would not be limited to the officer
who actually ordered the attack; rather, the negligence standard would
encompass the failure of superior officers to take reasonable steps to
prevent or punish the commission of disproportionate acts by their sub-
ordinates. Such negligence was in fact the basis of the finding of guilt
in In Re Yamashita,72 where a Japanese general was convicted by a
United States military commission for failing to take adequate measures
to control his troops, who had committed a wide range of atrocities in
the Philippines.13 Many of the defendants in the High Command case
at Nuremberg 4 were found guilty on a similar basis. In the United
States, pursuant to Paragraph 501, Section 27-10, of the United States
Army Field Manual, a commander is criminally liable for failure to take
necessary and reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the laws of
warfare or to punish violations thereof.
5
70. Id. at 1295-97. See R.E. Jordan, I, in TROOBOFF, supra note 5, at 57.
71. See Falk, in TROOBOFF, supra note 5, at 40.
72. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
73. In discussing the charges against General Yamashita, the Supreme Court said:
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose exercises are
unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander would almost certainly
result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose
to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would largely
be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect
to take reasonable measures for their protection.
327 U.S. at 15 (emphasis supplied).
It should be noted, however, that there is considerable controversy over whether General
Yamashita was found to have actual knowledge of his troops' atrocities or whether he was
held liable for actions of which he should have known. See ThOOBOFF, supra note 5, at 33-
34.
74. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, X-XI TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILrARY TRiBUNALs (1948).
75. See Taylor, in TROOBOFF, supra note 5, at 226. Under Paragraph 501 of the Field
Manual, constructive knowledge may be imputed to the officer on the basis of military
reports or other sources of information.
In view of this standard of actual or constructive knowledge, the judge's charge in the
Medina case, which stated that the officer must have actual knowledge of the offenses
being committed, is subject to criticism. See Gard, Jr., in TRooaoFF, supra note 5, at 230.
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The issue has often arisen as to who should bear the ultimate
responsibility for illegal acts of warfare. This problem was addressed in
the High Command case,7" where the Nuremberg tribunal, noting the
decentralization of modem military organization and the delegation of
authority by commanders to subordinates, stated that a high com-
mander could not realistically keep informed of all the details of mili-
tary operations. Therefore, liability should not attach to him merely on
the basis of his superior position in the chain of command." According
to the tribunal, in order for a commander to be held criminally liable,
"[t]here must be personal dereliction. That can occur only where the
act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise
his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part.""
To determine whether a high commander had ultimate responsibility
for a violation of proportionality, a court or tribunal would focus on a
number of factors. These would include the commander's proximity in
the chain of command to the officer who committed the violation, the
nature of the military units under the defendant's command (e.g.
whether they were stable or highly mobile units), the mobility of the
commander vis-A-vis units under his command," the size of the com-
mander's own staff and the comprehensiveness of its duties, and the
nature of the combat situation (e.g. whether it was stable or fluid)." In
many instances these issues would never be reached, since a nation
might be reluctant to prosecute its own high officials or those of other
countries due to the adverse political repercussions such prosecutions
would have. Trials of the highest wartime military officials would most
likely occur in a situation of total victory and defeat, where a completely
new leadership had arisen in the vanquished nation after the war. This
was the scenario in the Nuremberg Trials and the other major war
crimes trials of this century."
Besides the problem of command responsibility, the inverse issue of
"superior orders" would also arise in prosecutions of disproportionate
acts. In the My Lai and Nuremberg Trials, many of the defendants
invoked the defense that they had no choice but to follow the orders of
76. XI TRL Ls OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MIurARY TRmuNALs 543-44
(1948).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 543. See Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MILrrARY L. REv.
1, 43 (1973).
79. The helicopter has greatly increased the mobility of the field commander, as the
Vietnam experience indicated. See Parks, supra note 78, at 92.
80. Id. at 90-95.
81. See Goldenberg, Crimes Against Humanity 1945-1970, 10 W. ONT. L. REv. 1, 30
(1971).
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their commanding officers." The United States Army Field Manual,
however, has limited the availability of this defense to situations in
which the accused did not know, and could not reasonably have known,
that the order was unlawful. This places the officer in a dilemma, for
he must decide, often in the heat of battle, whether the order is unlawful
and should be disobeyed." Since Article 90 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice subjects a soldier to criminal liability for failure to obey
lawful orders," the officer may well decide that the safer course would
be to obey the order, at least in instances where the order is arguably
legal.
The officer's decison would probably be heavily influenced by his
perception of the relative risks of prosecution for disobeying superior
orders and prosecution for committing war crimes. Judging from the
experience of the past few decades, the chances of prosecution for war
crimes would be relatively slight. For example, after World War II the
Allies refrained from prosecuting any individuals whatsoever, even those
on the losing side, for aerial bombardments causing massive civilian
damage. Similarly, the United States has failed to exercise its prosecu-
torial responsibilities under the Civilians Convention. Only a handful of
those involved in the My Lai massacre were prosecuted, and they were
tried for conventional crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, such as murder and maiming, rather than for war crimes. 7 Also,
former military personnel are generally immune from prosecution for
acts committed overseas. The Supreme Court held in Toth v. Quarles"
that a person discharged from the service could no longer be tried by a
military court. Furthermore, ex-servicepersons cannot be tried in a
federal nonmilitary court for alleged crimes committed overseas, unless
the act took place within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
82. The Hague and Geneva conventions do not address the issue of superior orders. See
TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 47.
83. Id. at 51.
84. However, even if the officer obeys the order and is subsequently prosecuted for a
war crime, fear of punishment by superiors, while not a complete defense, is a mitigating
circumstance which can reduce the sentence.
85. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970).
86. The Allies themselves carried out such attacks to a considerable extent; in fact,
some authorities have remarked that the Allies engaged in such bombing to a greater
extent than the other side. See Wasserstrom, Richard A. Wasserstrom in TROOBOFF, supra
note 5, at 196. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Allies did not prosecute such
activities or that the 1949 Geneva Conventions failed to include prohibitions against
indiscriminate aerial bombardments. See Baxter, supra note 2, at 2-3.
87. See Comment, My Lai Massacre: The Need for an International Investigation, 58
CALIF. L. Rxv. 703, 705-15 (1970).
88. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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United States, e.g. on a military base. 9
There are a number of reasons why nations have generally failed to
prosecute their own nationals, including the jurisdictional limitations
discussed above, the failure to recognize the applicability of the laws of
warfare to specific fact situations," and the unwillingness of nations to
draw world attention to their own violations.9 The latter reason reflects
a somewhat myopic attitude, as a nation might improve its image in
world public opinion by undertaking an active prosecution of its own
nationals. Such prosecutions would put the rest of the world on notice
that a nation does not intend to tolerate illegal acts of warfare by its
officers.2
Trials of foreign nationals for war crimes present a special problem:
the danger that the prosecuting party will impose stricter standards of
guilt on the defendants than on its own side for similar conduct. 3 This
was reflected in some of the Nuremberg trials. 4 Such a problem could
manifest itself in various ways in a trial of the losing side for violations
of proportionality. For example, the victorious power's view of the mili-
89. See Rubin, supra note 66, at 270-71.
90. See note 2 supra.
91. See Baxter, supra note 2, at 4.
92. See Comment, supra note 87, at 722.
93. Addressing this problem, Telford Taylor has said:
But as long as enforcement of the laws of war is left to the belligerents themselves,
whether during the course of hostilities or by the victors at their conclusion, the
scope of their application must be limited by the extent to which they have been
observed by the enforcing party. To punish the foe-especially the vanquished
foe-for conduct in which the enforcing nation has engaged, would be so grossly
inequitable as to discredit the laws themselves.
TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 38-39.
94. According to Rubin:
The instances of the victors in a war applying a harsher measure, a more rigid
standard of judgment, to the vanquished than it applies to its own personnel in
time of war have been often documented, particularly in the Nuremberg tribu-
nals. An example often commented upon was the conviction of the Nazi Admirals
Doenitz and Raeder after World War II of the war crimes involved in ordering
unrestricted submarine warfare under circumstances in which American and Brit-
ish naval authorities had themselves ordered similar unrestricted submarine
warfare. To my knowledge, none of the American and British naval commanders
giving the illegal orders was ever brought before a tribunal.
Rubin, supra note 66, at 268.
In addition to noting this double standard of guilt, observers have also characterized
war crimes trials as vehicles for pinning guilt on particular individuals. The Nuremberg
tribunals, for example, have been described as a "measured process of fixing guilt." J.
SHKLAR, LEGALISM 158 (1964). Thus, a nation may be motivated to conduct war crimes
trials for reasons other than a recognition of its prosecutorial responsibilities under the
law of warfare.
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tary advantage criterion might be conditioned by the fact that it won
the conflict, so that the enemy's actions would be more difficult to
justify on military advantage grounds than its own actions.
B. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE LACK OF PROSECUTORIAL ZEAL
Although traditional international sanctions such as diplomatic pro-
tests, censures, and boycotts are theoretically available to nations as
means of pressuring other countries to prosecute illegal acts of warfare,
nations have been quite reluctant to employ such measures for this
purpose. Such sanctions would likely result in detrimental political and
economic consequences, such as loss of a trading partner, that would
outweigh the desired benefits of increased prosecution. 5 Moreover, there
is no guarantee that such measures would actually force countries to
undertake a more active prosecution of war crimes.
One possible solution to the lack of prosecutorial zeal would be to
create an international criminal tribunal with jurisdiction over war
crimes." However, the obstacles to the formation of such a tribunal
would be formidable. Such a tribunal could only operate if there were
a universal penal code, agreement by member nations as to trial proce-
dures, and an effective enforcement system." Furthermore, nations
would have to acquiesce to the jurisdiction of such a tribunal, and they
might well be reluctant to do so for reasons such as fear of political
embarrassment.
At this point in history, then, improvements in the prosecution of war
crimes will have to be made at the national level. One solution which
has been proposed for the United States is the creation of a special
prosecuting unit for military crimes, including war crimes. 8 At present
the commanding officer generally has the responsibility of deciding
when a court-martial should be convened for prosecution of subordi-
nates. This method of prosecution is highly inappropriate for war
crimes, since the commander is reluctant to draw attention to his own
failure to properly supervise the conduct of his subordinates? The es-
tablishment of an independent prosecuting unit, responsible only to the
Secretary of Defense, would alleviate this problem. The staff of such an
95. Similar political and economic considerations would impede war crime prosecutions
of officials of other nations. See text immediately following note 80 supra.
96. For a discussion of efforts to develop an international criminal court, see Golden-
berg, supra note 81, at 23-26.
97. See Paust, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident: A Response to Professor Rubin,
50 ORE. L. REv. 138, 151 (1971).
98. See Remarks by Tom Farer, 1972 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 183, 191; Note,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 82 YALE L.J. 1274, 1291 (1973).
99. See Note, supra note 98, at 1291.
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office would be comprised of civilian prosecutors and investigators at-
tached to military units but entirely independent of command influ-
ence.
Such an office would face a number of problems. Its attachment to
military units would likely create frictions between military officers and
the office's staff. The officers might attempt to conceal evidence from
the staff or make it difficult for the staff to visit the locale of an alleged
war crime.' 0 Additionally, the office would be subject to pressures from
the Secretary of Defense and other public officials who might regard
certain prosecutions or investigations as damaging to the United States.
Such pressures and controls would, of course, decrease the likelihood of
prosecution of those at the apex of the military hierarchy. Despite these
shortcomings, however, the establishment of an independent prosecut-
ing unit appears at present to be the most viable solution to the existing
laxity in the enforcement of the laws of warfare.
CONCLUSION
Codification of the proportionality principle would constitute an
important step in the development of the law of warfare by filling a
sizeable gap in the existing law of civilian protection. Although the
officer will at times find it difficult to apply the proportionality principle
under the exigencies of warfare, he will generally be well-informed as to
the desired military advantage, the means of warfare, and the military
target, and this information will enable him to weigh the anticipated
military benefits against the probable civilian losses. The officer should
be held criminally liable for disproportionate acts resulting from his
failure to exercise due care or from intentional or reckless conduct. If
violations of proportionality are treated as war crimes and are actively
prosecuted, there will be cause for hope that proportionality can become
an integral part of military decision-making rather than an abstract
principle of civilian protection.
Bernard L. Brown
100. The Protecting Power, discussed at note 60 supra, could assist the staff of the
prosecuting office in gathering evidence and investigating alleged violations of the law of
warfare.
